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Abstract
We analyze a standard employee selection model given two institutional constraints:
rst, professional experience perfectly substitutes insu¢ cient formal education for in-
siders while this substitution is imperfect for outsiders. Second, in the latter case the
respective substitution rate increases with the advertised minimum educational require-
ment. Optimal selection implies that the expected level of formal education is higher for
outsider than for insider recruits. Moreover, this di¤erence in educational attainments
increases with lower optimal minimum educational job requirements. Investigating data
of a large US public employer conrms both of the above theoretical implications. Gen-
erally, the econometric model exhibits a good t.
Keywords: employee selection, overeducation, adverse impact, insiders vs outsiders.
JEL-Classications: M51 (Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions), J53 (Labor-
Management Relations; Jurisprudence), J78 (Labor Discrimination; Public Policy), I21
(Analysis of Education).
1 Introduction
Generally, every US employer is free to employ individuals at his will. However, selection
criteria must be validated and qualication requirements must be set reasonably to avoid
disparate impact charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 To the extent
that members of minority groups, women, or disabled individuals have been socially
excluded from obtaining the respective formal education or training, such requirements
can be ruled excessively restrictive - i. e. set to preclude successful applications from
these groups.2 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has then introduced the right to a jury trial,
extended the group of potential plainti¤s, and eased the use of statistical information
as evidence. Moreover, by allowing for punitive damages in addition to back-pay the
act has increased the potential costs per case.3 Since such claims can concern wrongful
non-hirings as well as non-promotions, this legal risk applies to all employee selection
processes within rms.4
To reduce this risk, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC ) ad-
vises to phrase qualication requirements in terms of necessary skills and abilities rather
than formal educational degrees or years of experience.5 This advice meets with a second
set of rules that is rooted in the employers duty to provide job security and career devel-
opment.6 Fair selection standards may thus require to be alternatively phrased in terms
of formal educational requirements and substitute professional experience criteria. In
this respect, public sector employees are additionally covered by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to Equal Protection.7 The federal government itself has therefore committed
to a set of rules laid out in the Operating Manual: Qualication Standards for General
Schedule Positions.8 This manual lists educational degree and equivalent professional
1See Carlson (2005, p. 126 - 132) for an account of origins and consequences of non-discrimination
law and precedence court decisions concerning the employee selection process.
2 In the original case - see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) - the company required a
highschool diploma and a certain score on a general aptitude test to qualify for internal promotion. The
court found that these requirements disparately impact ethnic minority groups. Specically, African-
Americans were less likely to hold a highschool degree and averaged lower test scores and were, therefore,
selected at a much a lower rate.
3Oyer and Schaefer (2002).
4See Gutman (2003, 2004) for an overview of precedence cases and court decisions.
5See section 15-IX Proactive PreventionEEOC (2006).
6Clardy (2003).
7See Carlson (2005, p. 753 - 756).
8This manual is updated and published (without publication date) by the US O¢ ce of Personnel
Management, Washington D. C.
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experience requirements for specied hierarchical positions.9
Following the legislative development, the disparate impact issue has received re-
peated attention by economists.10 Yet, based on models of statistical discrimination,
such analyses are mostly conned to addressing the e¤ects across groups that are pro-
tected under this legislation. Nevertheless, Oyer and Schaefer (2002) already show that
the distributional consequences of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are signicant since pop-
ulation groups di¤er in their propensities to sue. However, given the above, the legal risk
is job-specic as well. Thus, setting qualication requirements in recruitment processes
is subject to a twofold set of constraints: the standards themselves must be reasonable
such as not to exclude qualied individuals. Moreover, professional experience gained in
similar - typically, reecting career tracks, hierarchically inferior - positions within the
rm can substitute for a lack of formal education.
Organizational and assessment psychology assumes that the human resources depart-
ment maximizes the expected on-the-job ability of the group of recruits. Our theoretical
model developed below then augments the standard textbook utility analysis11 of
personnel selection to include three predictors: educational attainment, professional ex-
perience, and test scores. Specically, we assume that the rm perfectly substitutes
professional experience for formal education when dealing with applications of current
employees while this substitution is less than perfect for applicants from outside the
rm. However, due to increased legal risk, the respective substitution rate applied to
outsider applications increases with higher minimum educational requirements.
Of course, with informative signals the probability of being hired monotonically
increases in all three signal values. However, given the constraints above, the expected
educational attainment of outsider recruits exceeds that of current employees. Further,
the wedge between the two groups expected educational levels widens as minimum
educational requirements are decreased. We further subject this selection model to
empirical testing using a data set supplied by a large US public employer. The data
allows to control for a number of characteristics that are specic to a particular job-
9The New York State Department of Civil Servicesview of Knowledge-Skill-Ability-Based Minimum
Qualications - see Martin (2005) - provides an interesting second example since it sets out to dene
an equivalence equationto compute substitute professional experience requirements.
10Respective contributions to annual meetings of the American Economic Association include Welch
(1981), Ashenfelter and Oaxaca (1987), Abram (1993), Coates and Loury (1993), and Betsey (1994).
11Holling (1998) provides a survey of model structures. Schmidt and Hunter (1998) discuss the origins
and development of this approach.
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opening, selection process, and individual applicant. The empirical analysis supports
our theoretical implications.
Since the seminal work of Freeman (1976) and Duncan and Ho¤man (1981), numerous
empirical studies for almost all developed economies have reported that overeducation
increases wages and employment probabilities. Also, this e¤ect is stronger for jobs that
require unskilled or lower-skilled labor than for skilled jobs.12 However, the explanations
o¤ered are mostly labor-market oriented.13 The career mobility approach developed by
Sicherman and Galor (1990) constitutes the notable exception: responding to their rms
human resources development strategy, individuals enhance their career progress by ac-
cepting underqualied workin early career stages. To our knowledge, only Groeneveld
and Hartog (2004) have so far provided an empirical test: investigating jobs sheltered
within a protected internal labor market, they conclude that the overeducation e¤ect on
wages reects such strategic behavior.
The contribution of our analysis is then threefold: rst, we empirically conrm the
existence of an overeducation e¤ect on hiring probabilities. However, this e¤ect is con-
ned to outsider recruits. Thus, we also nd evidence that the career mobility argument
does not apply to our rm. Second, we therefore provide a simple but novel theoretical
model to show that this selection behavior may rather be induced by institutional con-
straints. Since these constraints restrict the use of informative signals, the rms outsider
recruits are only seemingly overqualied - i.e. without the constraints the rm would
have actually advertised higher standards. Hence, third and adding to the debate on
the e¤ects of hiring quotas derived from models of statistical discrimination, our argu-
ments highlight the informational ine¢ ciency induced by the threat of disparate impact
charges.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section informs about
the selection process as it has been described in interviews with the rms human re-
sources department. Given this description, we develop the theoretical model and derive
testable hypotheses. Section 3 then provides a description of the data, develops the
econometric approach, and reports our empirical ndings. The paper concludes with a
summary and discussion - the latter also addressing new regulations currently emerging
12See Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000).
13Hence, emphasizing ine¢ cient investment in ability signals, arguments derived from Spences (1973)
theory of labor market signaling and Thurows (1975) theory of job competition compete with Sattingers
(1993) assignment theory. See, for instance, Hartog (2000), Bauer (2002), and Chevalier (2003) for
literature surveys and respective applications.
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in the European educational systems.
2 The theoretic approach
2.1 Description of the institutional setting
We adapt the standard recruitment model by introducing specic assumptions concern-
ing the sequential structure of the selection process and the binding or non-binding
nature of minimum qualication requirements. These assumptions are derived from
qualitative interviews with executive managers of the human resource department of the
rm supplying its data for the empirical analysis to follow.
This process is best described as a step-wise procedure. It begins when the rms
responsible nancial executive o¢ cer (FEO) agrees to a job opening demanded by the
department of employment (DoE ). In a rst step, the human resources department
(HR) and DoE must then agree on the classication of the job in terms of the bundle of
tasks expected to be carried out, its hierarchical and organizational imbeddedness, and
the minimum educational and professional experience requirements. This agreement
determines a salary range that can later only be stretched by special consent of the
FEO. HR considers the rm - by far being the largest employer in the region - to possess
monopsony power. In fact, revisions of the salary range by FEO constitute very rare
exceptions. Generally, the rms salary ranges are su¢ ciently attractive for applicants.
In a second step, HR advertises the job openings publicly - i.e. by postings and
departmental mail within the rm, via newspaper ads, and on the internet. Jobs of
the same classication while allocated to di¤erent DoE s are advertised jointly. Hence,
typically a recruitment process aims at hiring a group of applicants. The advertisements
communicate the job classication, salary ranges, and the minimum educational and
professional requirements. Subsequently, HR receives applications from within and out-
side the rm which contain veriable documents concerning educational attainments and
professional experiences. HR reserves the right to reject applications for formal reasons
- i.e. if the professional qualication of the candidate is obviously inadequate.
HR is mainly concerned with minimizing the legal costs associated with potential dis-
crimination charges brought against the rm by unsuccessful applicants. Specically, our
4
rm being a public employer observes that screening applications on grounds of formal
education bears the risk of disparate impact charges. Although the rm encourages its
employees to enroll in further education programs and obtain formal degrees, it also ac-
cepts that professional experience can substitute for lacking educational degrees. Given
the argument that educational standards may conceal discriminatory practises, the rate
of substitution is perceived as increasing with minimum educational requirements.14
Taken to its theoretic extreme, we assume that applicants who can document that
the sum of their educational and professional achievements exceeds the sum of the re-
spective two minimum requirements cannot be screened out. In principle, this rule
applies to all applications. However, since job requirements and their corresponding de-
scriptions always contain some rm-specic elements, the legal risk of screening is lower
when dealing with applications from outside the rm. Theoretically, we assume that
the professional experience claimed by outsiders is discounted when checking whether
an application meets the minimum requirements.15 The above then implies that the
respective discount factor increases in the advertised minimum educational standard.
In the third step of the recruitment process, all applicants who, given the di¤erence
in screening insiders and outsiders, pass the respective selection criteria are then pooled
and subjected to the same set of job-specic ability tests. These tests always include job
interviews with and formally evaluated by DoE. Conditional on the job type, other tests
of cognitive abilities and/or non-cognitive skills may be added. Appreciating the results
of these tests, DoE makes its hiring choices to be implemented by HR. However, before
negotiations with the successful applicants begin, HR carries out a rationality check of
DoEs choices. As emphasized in our interviews, HR ensures that test standards have
not been (re-)dened to meet a specic applicants prole.
Summarizing, two veriable signals - educational degree and professional experience
- are available for screening applicants to be passed on to testing. However, only the
sum of the two with professional experience discounted in outsider applications must
meet the cut-o¤ criterion. Testing then constitutes a costly activity which generates yet
14To put it more blankly, if a gardeners job would be advertised to require a PhD in botanics, every
less educated member of a socially disadvantaged group who could prove to have experience in lawn
mowing could successfully claim to have been discriminated.
15Hence, a top executives secretary may be required to possess a BA-degree. However, since this
requirement does not apply to secretary positions in general, internal candidates on a career track cannot
be excluded. In contrast, outsiders can be screened out by claiming that the position requires rm-specic
knowledge. Hence, their professional experience is discounted.
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a third signal.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Basic assumptions and notations
Given the above, let on-the-job ability a be identically and independently distributed
N(; 2a) over the two populations of applicants denoted insiders and outsiders. Further,
the degree of formal schooling s, professional experience x, and potential test scores z
are known to be identically, independently, and standard normally distributed over these
two populations. As usual, (y) and (y), y 2 fs; x; zg, denote the standard normal
distribution and density functions.
HR has carried out pre-tests to validate that
a = + ss+ xx+ zz + " (1)
where "  N(0; 2") is a measurement error with Cov("; y) = 0 for y 2 fs; x; zg. Real-
istically, the predictors are correlated. For instance, holding age constant, the duration
of formal education and professional experience should be negatively correlated.16 How-
ever, assuming stochastic independence between signals serves to identify the economic
mechanisms driving the outcome of this process of screening and testing. Hence, we
assume that Cov(s; x) = Cov(s; z) = Cov(x; z) = 0.
Let ray  0 denote the coe¢ cient of correlation between ability and the predictor
y, y 2 fs; x; zg. Then,  =  and y = rayay . To (signicantly) economize on space
and notation, we assume that rax = ras =  in the following.17 Further simplifying
notations, let raz = r.
Now, suppose that HR requires minimum educational qualication S and professional
experience X to select an applicant for testing. Let !I  s+x and 
  S+X. Note that
!I  N(0; 2) and denote the respective distribution and density functions by 	I(!I) and
 I(!I). Also, all applicants whose test score satises z  Z will actually be hired. Given
16Empirically, we can control for this e¤ect by entering age as an explanatory variable. See Anderson
et al. (2004) concerning the interaction of commonly used predictors.
17This assumption does not imply that the two signals are identical. Rather, they only serve equally
well as ability predictors.
6
the institutional constraints described above, the expected ability of insider recruits can
then be derived as
EIfa;S;X;Zg = (2)
+ a

rasEfs j !I  
g+ raxEfx j !I  
g+ razEfz j z  Zg

=
+ a
p
2
Z 1


!I
d	I(!I)
(1 	I (
)) + r
Z 1
Z
z
d(z)
(1   (Z))

.
For outsiders let  2 (0; 1) denote the discountfactor measuring the fraction of an
outsiders documented professional experience that qualies for the job opening.18 To
focus on the informational aspects of the screening process, we assume that this dis-
countingof an outsiders professional experience only a¤ects the possibility to enforce
the screening criteria S andX. As discussed above, we specically assume that  = (S),
with 
0
(S) > 0 and limS!1 (S) = 1. Thus, as HR raises the minimum educational
requirement, an outsiders professional experience must increasingly be accepted as a
substitute for (lack of) formal education.
Letting !O = s + (S)x, note that !O  N(0; 1 + ((S))2). Then, denote the
respective distribution and density functions by 	O(!O; (S)) and  O(!O; (S)). Hence,
the expected ability of outsider recruits can be obtained as
EOfa;S;X;Zg = (3)
+ a

rasEfs j !O  
g+ raxEfx j !O  
g+ razEfz j z  Zg

=
+ a
24 2q
1 + ((S))2
Z 1


!O
d	O(!O; (S))
(1 	O(
; (S))) + r
Z 1
Z
z
d(z)
(1   (Z))
35 .
Obviously, the above calculations of expected abilities demand that both groups
of applicants are su¢ ciently large. For simplicity, we further assume that they are of
identical size N . Given that there are M openings, the recruitment process must then
ensure that
(1   (Z))
24 X
A=I;O
 
1 	A(
)
35 = M
N
(4)
18Obviously, it would be more adequate to assume that an individual outsiders professional experience
is subject to a discount factor t where t constitutes a random variable with expected value  . Thus,
accounting only for the expected value of discounting implies that the distribution of t is independent of
the individuals signal prole (s; x; z).
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where MN < 1. The rms objective, implemented by HR, is to maximize the expected
ability
EF fa;S;X;Zg =
P
A=I;O
 
1 	A(
)EAfa;S;X;ZgP
A=I;O (1 	A(
))
(5)
of its new recruits net of the costs C associated with the ability tests. Following the
literature on testing for recruitment, these costs are xed and reect HRs choice of the
test design. Obviously, no such costs must be incurred if the recruitment decisions are
based only on the educational and professional information supplied by the applicants
themselves.
2.2.2 Screening and testing with only one group of applicants
Focussing on selecting recruits from only one group of applicants serves best to illustrate
the economic mechanism governing this particular recruitment process. Hence, to begin
with, we assume that there are only internal applications and set 	O(
) = 1 in (5) and
(4) above. The respective Lagrange-function can be derived as
LI = (Z) EIfa;S;X;Zg   C+ (1  (Z)) lim
Z ! 1
EIfa;S;X;Zg

 I

(1   (Z))  1 	I(
)  M
N

(6)
where
(Z) =
(
1 if (Z) 2 (0; 1]
0 if (Z) = 0
(7)
denotes an indicator function that captures the opportunity cost nature of C.
The rst-order conditions can be rearranged to yield:
(Z) : EIfa;S;X;Zg   C   lim
Z ! 1
EIfa;S;X;Zg
(
=

)
0 , (8)
if (Z)
(

=
)
0 ;
Y 2 fS;Xg : I (1   (Z)) + (Z)
 I (
)
C = (9)
a
p
2
(1 	I (
))
"

 
Z 1


!I
d	I
 
!I

(1 	I (
))
#
;
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Z : I
 
1 	I (
) = (10)
ar
(1   (Z))

Z  
Z 1
Z
z
d(z)
(1   (Z))

, if (Z) = 1 .
These conditions immediately reveal two important properties. First, according to (9),
HR will never set separate educational and professional minimum requirements if appli-
cations can only come from within the rm. Second, only if HR decides on additional
testing, an optimum recruitment policy may be characterized by balancing the marginal
returns from setting application and testing standards. Otherwise, expected ability is
simply determined by choosing 
 such as to satisfy (4) for  (Z) = 0.
Investigating (8) then reveals
EI  EIfa;S;X;Zg   C   lim
Z ! 1
EIfa;S;X;Zg = (11)
 C + ar
Z 1
Z
z
d(z)
(1   (Z))   a
p
2
Z e



!I
d	I
 
!I

	I
e
 	I (
)
where e
 is dened by 1 	I(e
) = MN . Accounting for (4) given the above assumption
that 	O = 1, limZ ! 1EI =  C < 0. Additional testing can thus be optimal if the
respective costs are low. Also, the coe¢ cient of correlation r between ability and the test
score should be large relative to , the latter reecting the correlation between ability
and the signal content of the application documents.
Job interviews are likely to qualify in this respect.19 For the remainder, we will
therefore assume such an interior solution. In the present case, it implies
r
h
Z   R1Z z d(z)(1 (Z))i

h

  R1
 !I d	I(!I)(1 	I(
))i = 1 
C
 
1 	I (
)
 I (
)a
h

  R1
 !I d	I(!I)(1 	I(
))i > 1. (12)
As expected, the testing costs induce a distortion: selection according to test scores is
over-restrictive.
Setting 	I(
) = 1 in (5) and (4) then allows to characterize the alternative scenario
of hiring only from a pool of outsiders. Only switching superscripts, the rst-order
conditions with respect to (Z) and Z restate (8) and (10) from above. Yet, (9) is
19See e. g. Dakin and Armstrong (1989) and, distinguishing selection criteria in great detail, Robertson
and Smith (2001).
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replaced by,
X : O (1   (Z)) + (Z)
 O (
)
C = (13)
2a
(1 	O (
))
q
1 + ((S))2
"

 
Z 1


!O
d	O
 
!O

(1 	O (
))
#
;
S : O (1   (Z)) + (Z)
 O (
)
C = (14)
2a
(1 	O (
))
q
1 + ((S))2
"

 
Z 1


!O
d	O
 
!O

(1 	O (
))
#
+
2a
0(S)(S)
 O (
)

1 + ((S))2
 3
2
Z 1


!O
d	O
 
!O

(1 	O (
)) ,
where we have made use of the properties of the normal distribution to obtain (14).
Taking the limits S !1 of the RHS of (13) and (14), this corner solution violates (4)
since all applicants would be screened out. Further, taking the respective limits S !  1
implies that the expected signal values are zero. Hence, the applicantsdocuments would
not be used for screening at all. However, since this information is costless for the rm,
this corner solution can also be ruled out. Again, an interior solution is ensured if it is
optimal to test the applicants. The preceding arguments then imply that this solution
must be characterized by 0 < (S) < 1.
Comparing (13) and (14) with (9) reveals that the interior solution implies distinctly
separate minimum educational and professional experience requirements in the outsider-
recruitment case. From a purely informational economics perspective, discountingthe
professional experience of outsiders increases the precision of the signal !O which is
subjected to the cut-o¤ criterion 
.
Two e¤ects then determine an optimal increase in precision. First, as (S) decreases,
the two signals x and s contained in !O can increasingly be used separately to predict
on-the-job ability. Yet, the positive e¤ect of this signal separation on the precision of
!O is traded-o¤ against the fact that professional experience also receives less weight as
a predictor of ability. In the extreme, for (S) = 0, experience is not used for screening
at all.
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2.2.3 Recruiting from two independent pools of insiders and outsiders
Given the description of the institutional setting with mandatory public job advertise-
ments, HR organizes the recruitment process to maximize (5) subject to (4). Yet, char-
acterizing the solution does not add further analytic insights. The respective rst-order
conditions with respect to the minimum educational and professional experience require-
ments, S and X, merely contain weighted sums of the terms in (13), (14), and (9). The
weights are given by
P
A=I;O  (
)=
P
A=I;O
 
1 	A(
).
Hence, the characterizations above carry over in the sense that, if - given the costs
of testing - the test scores are used for selection, the solution balances the marginal re-
turns from using all three signals for recruitment. Separate educational and professional
experience standards will then be advertised but only enforced in screening outsider
applications. These analytic conclusions imply the following hypotheses for empirical
testing:
H1: Outsider recruits are characterized by higher educational levels than insider re-
cruits.
Since insider applications resemble the current structure of educational attainments
in the rms labor force, new employees therefore appear to be overqualied. How-
ever, such new recruits are only seemingly overqualied: suppose the threat of disparate
impact charges would not constrain HR in advertising and enforcing educational re-
quirements. Then, it would clearly require higher educational standards that would
adequately account for the respective signal value. The insider-outsider di¤erence then
reects that HR cannot economize on this signal value at all when dealing with the
former group.
Further, recall that lower minimum educational requirements S ceteris paribus in-
crease the possibility of discounting the professional experience of outsiders.20 This
policy is optimal because it increases the precision of the screening process. Since the
e¤ect only applies to outsider applications, recruiting for jobs which are advertised to
20Within the current framework, the typical ceteris paribus clause particularly implies that other
job characteristics (technical vs. administrative, superior vs. inferior hierarchical position etc.) are held
constant.
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require rather low educational degrees result in relatively more overqualiednew em-
ployees. Hence, it also follows:
H2: The overqualication e¤ect on the group of outsider recruits increases with lower
minimum educational standards set for successful applicants.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data
In May 2003, the rm - a large US public employer - introduced an online recruiting
system. Starting with this date, all job applicants were required to (also) le an electronic
application and obtain log-in user-names and passwords. Hence, our data covers the
time period from the introduction of this system to February 2006. During this phase
HR assigned a team to provide assistance for potential applicants. The data is further
restricted to rank-and-le employee and laborer positions; recruitment processes aimed
at lling executive positions are excluded. Our data set comprises 33780 observations
of individuals who (a) led complete applications during this time-span and (b) entered
a recruitment process which had reached a nal decision by the end of our observation
period. There were 1244 of such processes (see Table 1).
The data set contains information concerning the educational attainments of all
candidates. All possible US degrees - i.e. doctorate, master, bachelor, some college
education, high school degree, highschool equivalent degree (GED), and only some high
school education - can be found among both the applicants and the recruits (see Table
2). The data further contains the applicants work experience, age, gender, race, and
the recruitment channel by which she had been attracted. Each application is linked to
a job-opening for which the data set provides the expected date of commencing work,
position title, DoE, and type of appointment (Job Type). The latter ranges from 1 for
Contingent/On-Call Labor (no benets) to 6 for Regular/Full-Time Employee (eligible
for benets).
Upon our request, HR also supplied the respective advertised required levels of ed-
ucation, the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) code numbers which increase in
steps of 10 points from 10 (executive, administrative and managerial positions) to 70
12
(service and maintenance positions), the Fair Labor Standards Act status (FLSA) which
takes on the value 1 if the job is exempt (no overtime pay) and zero otherwise, and
the workplace scores (Grade). The latter reect the necessary skills and experience, the
complexity of the tasks and creativity required in exercising them, the jobs impact on
the rms mission, exposure to internal and external contacts, the degree of discretion in
decision making, physical stress, and working conditions. The weights associated with
these factors are determined consensually by HR and the DoE prior to advertising the
job opening. Calculated as a weighted sum of these factors, the score determines the
compensation range.
Dening overqualication as possessing a higher than the advertised educational
degree, Table 3 reveals that the majority of the recruits - i.e. 58% - were overqualied,
while 34% actually possessed just the minimum required educational degree (exactly
Qualied). If the applications were forwarded by direct contact from a DoE (DCD)
or other internal reference (IR), we classify the respective applicants as insiders. They
constitute 11:4% of all applicants. All other recruitment channels - i.e. initiated by web-
based job posting board, the rms own website, newspaper advertisements (NwAd), job
notices sent to colleges or universities (JNU ) or to the state employment o¢ ce (SEO),
and other (ORC ) - in sum dene the outsider status.
Combining the rst two of the above as web-recruitment channels (WebRc), they
account for those 77% of the applications which doubtlessly come from outside the rm
(see Table 3). Insiders (IR&DCD) then form the largest group among recruits who
are underqualied. In contrast, outsiders constitute the largest group among the hired
overqualied applicants. This observation clearly suggests that insider and outsider
applications receive rather di¤erent appraisals during the recruitment process.
3.2 Denitions of variables and OLS-estimation
The dependent variable Status in the regression reported in Table 4 takes on the value
1 if the applicant is hired and zero otherwise. Characterizing the particular job open-
ing, Grade, the EEO code number, the FLSA status variable, and Job Type serve as
explanatory variables. The characteristics of the recruitment processes are captured by
the total number of job-candidates (Applications) per job. In addition, the number of ap-
plications which used the same recruitment channel (Appl.s Rc) reects the individuals
competitive environment.
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As explained above, an insider application is dened by the use of internal references.
Including the recruitment channel used by a particular outsider applicant then serves to
examine whether there exists a dominant form of attracting successful candidates from
outside the rm. Other variables characterizing the individual applicant are Age, Sex
(equal to 1 if the applicant is male), professional Experience, and the minority status
(Non-White).21 Unfortunately, the data only allows to identify whether the individual
possesses (1) or does not possess (0) adequate professional experiences as judged by HR.
As usual, we also include the square of the individuals age to allow for a non-linear
age-productivity prole.
Clearly, the variables reecting the applicants educational background are of key
interest. The variable Education ranges from 0 for completed rst grade to 19 for a
doctorate degree. This coding of educational attainments thus mirrors the individuals
time spent in formal education. To capture a possible non-linear education-productivity
relationship we also include the square of this variable. Exact Qual takes on the value 1
if the applicant is just qualied relative to the advertised minimum educational level. We
similarly construct Over Qual and Less Qual to denote the over and less qualied appli-
cants, respectively. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we exclude Over Qual from the
regressions. According to our theoretical model, the insider e¤ect on the hiring prob-
ability manifests in professional experience substituting for a lack of formal education.
Thus, we include the respective interaction variables Exp Ins. and Educ Ins. between
Experience and Education and the insider status.
Table 4 shows the results from performing a simple OLS regression. The probability
to be recruited is lower for non-whites and older applicants where the latter e¤ect appears
to level out. Higher hiring probabilities for women likely reect the overall dominance
of administrative jobs in the sample. The negative sign for Job Type also meets our
expectations since the value of this variable decreases with more attractive hierarchical
positions. More competition for the job - as measured by Applications and Applicants
Rc - decreases the probability to be hired. Among the recruitment channels for outsiders,
web-based applications exhibit a strong positive impact, while being sent by the state
employment agency decreases the hiring probability. Clearly, the former signals more
and the latter less intense private e¤orts in nding a job.
Focussing on the key qualication variables, both better education and professional
experience obviously increase the probability to be hired. Further, the e¤ects of higher
21More detailed ethnic classications did not prove statistically signicant.
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formal education are even stronger for insiders. Moreover, both Exact Qual and Less
Qual are positive and highly signicant. On rst sight, being overqualied therefore does
not appear to yield higher success probabilities. However, recall from the description of
the institutional setting that HR and DoE agree on the specication of the job opening
in the rst step of the recruitment process. This specication is used to calculate the
workplace score (Grade) and is publicly advertised. While HR strictly oversees that
the job specications are not revised during the selection process, expectations concern-
ing the relative scarcity of qualied applicants may nevertheless a¤ect DoEs e¤orts to
negotiate a higher score.
Since a higher score implies a more generous salary range, there may therefore exist
a second indirect e¤ect of the applicantsqualication structure on the hiring proba-
bility. Specically, the process of obtaining the workplace score may have induced an
endogeneity problem. Moreover, following Wooldridge (2002, p. 604), our estimates
will be unbiased, consistent, and asymptotically normal only if the decision to apply is
random across the two groups. However, recall that entering an application requires the
ability to use a computer and to set up an online account - both likely to be correlated
with the individuals educational status. Hence, HRs on-site assistance in ling the
online application may have induced a selection problem by encouraging relatively more
applications by less qualied insiders.
3.3 The IV-regression
Both the endogeneity and the selection problems discussed above warrant the use of in-
strumental variables. Hence, we instrument Grade to account for the endogeneity of the
job specication mechanism. Our interviews suggest that the three DoE -types within
the rm (i.e., central administration, DoE sta¤ positions, and technical support and ser-
vices), face di¤erent labor market characteristics and, consequently, determine workplace
scores such as to generate attractive salary ranges. Consequently, the department-types
qualify as adequate instruments. To avoid multicollinearity, technical support and ser-
vices constitutes a benchmark department-type.
Furthermore, the number of applications by individuals who possess a higher than
the minimum required educational degree - denoted Overqualied - proxies the rms
expectation concerning the scarcity of the respective personnel. Given the above, the
decision to le an application should be a function of the recruiting channel reecting an
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applicants access to on-site assistance. Conditional on this covariate, the participation
decisions should be independent between the two groups. Controlling for the recruit-
ing channel in a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS ) approach then appears su¢ cient to
overcome this problem.
First, we perform the Hausman test for endogeneity to address the quality of our
arguments above. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 361 and p. 471), we insert the
predicted residuals from the reduced form into the main regression equation and test
whether the respective coe¢ cient is statistically di¤erent from zero. We implement
Murphy and Topels (2002) approach to correct the standard errors and report the
results for the linear probability model (LPM ) in Table 5. The respective F -statistic
attains the value 17:13. Thus, we strongly reject the null of no endogeneity. This result
generally conrms the adequacy of the 2SLS -approach to capture the specic features
of the rms recruitment process.
Further, note that in the reduced form (i.e. the left column of Table 5) the coe¢ cient
on the number of overqualied applicants is positive and highly signicant. This nding
conrms that HR and DoE agree on higher workplace scores when they expect more
highly qualied job candidates.22 However, to achieve a correct inference in the 2SLS
framework, we check the correlation between the endogenous variable and the instru-
ments. The F -test for the null-hypothesis on the coe¢ cients of Central Dept, DoE Dept,
and Overqualied reveals a value of 376.92. Since this statistic follows a 2-distribution
with three degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected.23 Given a partial
R2 of 0:7183 of the rst-stage regression and the F -statistic above, we conclude that our
instruments are strong predictors of the endogenous variable.24
Comparing the partial e¤ects of our 2SLS-LPM model (Table 5) with those derived
using OLS (Table 4) and logit and probit (Table 6) reveals only small di¤erences.25 With
the exception of Grade that is instrumented, all other coe¢ cients of the 2SLS regression
22Within our sample, Grade varies in between 50 and 65.Hence, one more overqualied applicant per
job increases this score by 0:002 points.
23Following Staiger and Stock (1997), the respective F -statistic should be greater than 10:83:
24Baker et al. (1995). Also, we have experimented with other potential instruments and performed
overidentication tests. However, the respective Lagrange Multiplier tests did not support the inclusion
of any other instrument.
25We report the marginal e¤ects using both logit and probit models mainly for comparison and ro-
bustness checks. Note, however, that interaction variables cannot be interpreted in the usual way in
either logit or probit models. Following Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction e¤ect must be calculated
as @2 () =(@x1@x2) = 120 ()+ (1 + 12x2)(2 + 12x1)00 () :
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preserve their signs and magnitudes. Moreover, the switch in sign for Grade does not
indicate a lack of robustness. Rather, the presence of overqualied applicants constitutes
a strong determinant of the workplace score. This argument then clearly supports the
IV-approach. As before, more competition for the job - as measured by Applications
and Applicants Rc - decreases the probability to be hired. The former, however, enters
via the recruiters expectation when determining the workplace score (Grade).
Also, note that in the 2SLS regression the coe¢ cient on Less Qual becomes insignif-
icant. Hence, accounting for the endogeneity of Grade, the less-qualied do not exhibit
higher success probabilities relative to the overqualied applicants anymore. Further,
the marginal e¤ects after logit and probit suggest that the e¤ects of higher formal edu-
cation and professional experience are even stronger for insiders. The marginal e¤ects of
the interaction variables are highly signicant (see Figures 1 - 2). These results support
our theoretical model since insiders are on average less qualied.
As is well known, heteroskedasticity will induce inconsistent estimators in both probit
and logit regressions. However, according to Wooldridge (2005, p. 479), this problem
only a¤ects the latent model. Thus, the issue of inconsistent estimation of the slope
parameters is practically irrelevant: probit may provide reasonable estimates of the
partial e¤ects even though logit is the correct model. In our case, the estimated partial
e¤ects are very similar for logit and probit.
3.4 Insider-outsider e¤ects on the screening mechanism
We are further interested in the validity of hypothesis H2. In a next step, we therefore
dene dependent variables according to whether the individual is hired for a job that
require a highschool diploma, a bachelors, or a masters degree. Testing for di¤erences
on the coe¢ cients of Experience and Education across these three subgroups, we use a
simultaneous system of equations of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) type.26
Given the endogeneity problem, we therefore perform a Three Stage Least Squares Re-
gression (3SLS ).
To save space, we only report the estimates for the key variables in Table 7. The
coe¢ cients on both Experience and Education are decreasing with increasing minimum
26Hence, we can also exploit the information contained in the variance/covariance matrix across jobs
with di¤erent educational requirements.
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educational requirements. Conrming our former ndings, the F -test for the null hy-
pothesis that the coe¢ cients on Education are all zero yields the value 40:51 which is
signicantly higher than the critical value given a 2-square distribution with two de-
grees of freedom. We also perform pairwise tests of equality among coe¢ cients. With
p-values of 0:0085 (0:0003) the null-hypotheses that the coe¢ cients of Education are
identical whether the rm hires a candidate with highschool or bachelor degree (bache-
lor or master degree, respectively) is strongly rejected. Thus, H2 appears to be conrmed
as well.
However, focussing on Educ. Ins. there appears to be no clear pattern within the
group of insiders. Thus, a third set of dependent variables distinguishes whether a recruit
possesses a higher educational degree than advertised as required (OverStatus), is exactly
qualied (ExactStatus), or underqualied (LessStatus). In Table 8 we again report the
results only for the key coe¢ cients. The highly positive and signicant coe¢ cient of the
Insiders when the dependent variable is LessStatus then implies that being an insider and
underqualied actually increases the chances of being hired. This aligns with previous
ndings in Table 4. More importantly, however, it clearly contradicts the validity of the
career mobility approach within the current context.
Finally, the top entries in Table 9 report the predicted average probabilities of being
hired given that an applicant is overqualied, exactly qualied, or underqualied. The
LPM, logit, and probit estimates are almost identical. Therefore we only use the LPM-
results to derive the average hiring probabilities conditional on the advertised educational
requirement for the full sample and a sample excluding all insider observations. Clearly,
across all advertised degree requirements, the induced decrease in these predicted average
probabilities is largest for the underqualied applicants. Again, this observation supports
that, when competing for the same job, successful outsider recruits are characterized
by higher educational attainments than insiders. Yet, the latter are generally more
successful in becoming hired/promoted.
3.5 Goodness of t
Since we are using rm-level data, an immediate question concerns whether our empirical
results are also descriptive for the HRs activities and choices. Hence, we carry out the
Hosmer-Lemeshow (1982) goodness-of-t test. We divide our sample into six subsamples
to compare observed and predicted counts of outcome events. This number of subgroups
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corresponds to the number of di¤erent minimum levels of education advertised: jobs
which require (1) the ability to read and write, (2) a highschool diploma, (3) a post-
secondary (i.e. two-year college) degree, (4) a bachelors degree, (5) a master degree,
and (6) a doctorate degree.
Thus, the rst sextile in Table 10 corresponds to the 1/6-sample of applicants who
are characterized by the lowest while the sixth sextile is dened for the subgroup with the
highest probability to be hired. The Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) statistic is then computed
as
HL =
6X
i=1

(observed counts (i)   predicted counts (i))2
predicted counts (i)

. (15)
If the null hypothesis of a good t is true, this statistic is distributed 2 with four
degrees of freedom. Columns OBS_1 and EXP_1 in Table 10 list the observed and
predicted hiring cases while columns OBS_0 and EXP_0 contain the observed and
predicted non-hiring cases. The overall value of HL can be calculated as 4:77 implying
that the null hypothesis of a good t cannot be rejected with reasonable statistical
signicance.
Although the model therefore seems to t well, there may still be a large number
of cases where it fails to predict individual outcomes correctly. Given that a predicted
hiring is dened by a predicted probability of being hired exceeding 0:5, we compare
this predicted with the actual outcome (hiredor not hired) for every applicant. In
96:4% of all cases the predictions are correct (see Table 11). For non-hiring cases, this
probability even attains 99:82%. However, a hiring decision is correctly predicted in only
6:75% of the respective cases.
Of course, this percentage of correctly predicted hirings can be increased by lowering
the cut-o¤ probability dening this incidence. The functional relationship between the
percentage of correctly predicted recruitments and the cut-o¤ probability is denoted
sensitivity. Yet, increasing the cut-o¤ probability comes at the expense of increasing the
probability of predicting a hiring when the actual outcome is not hired. The respective
functional relationship between the percentage of falsely predicted recruitments and
the cut-o¤ probability is denoted 1-specicity. Thus, Figure 4 depicts sensitivity as a
decreasing and specicity as an increasing curve of the cut-o¤ probability which denes
a predicted hiring.
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The so-called ROC-curve27 draws out the sensitivity-specicity trade-o¤and provides
a benchmark: the predictive power of a model is better the higher the curve arches above
the 45-degree line. The ROC-curve would coincide with this line if the model would
both correctly and falsely predict 50% of all recruitments for all cut-o¤ probabilities.
The area under the ROC-curve is 0:7960 when we include all observations. However,
we also calculate this curve using out-of-sample-forecasts. Specically, we randomly
exclude 10% of the successful applicants and re-estimate the model. Given the newly
estimated coe¢ cients, we compute the hiring probabilities of the recruits previously
excluded. The area under the respective ROC-curve then equals 0:7963. Since this value
is not signicantly di¤erent at a 5% -level from the one obtained for the full sample,28
Figure 5 displays the ROC-curve only for this out-of-sample-case.
4 Summary and policy discussion
We analyze a standard employee selection model given two stylized institutional con-
straints: rst, professional experience can perfectly substitute for a lack of formal ed-
ucation for insiders while this substitution is imperfect for applications from outside
the rm. Second, due to increased legal risk, the respective discount rateapplied to
professional experience when dealing with outsider applications increases with the ad-
vertised minimum educational requirement. The optimal selection policy then implies
that the expected level of formal education is higher for outsider than for insider recruits.
However, new recruits are only seemingly overqualied: in absence of these constraints
restricting the signal value of education, the respective standards would be set higher
and identically equal for both groups.
Moreover, the legal risk to experience disparate impact charges if educational re-
quirements are increased is higher for low-skilled than for higher-skilled jobs. Hence,
the di¤erence in educational attainments between the two groups of recruits increases
with lower educational job requirements. The insider-outsider e¤ects are very specic
to our theoretic approach and are strongly supported by our empirical results. At the
same time, these results are also generally consistent with previous empirical work on
the overeducation e¤ect on the probability to be hired from the external labor market.
Yet, in strong contrast with the career mobility approach as the alternative theoretic
27 I. e. the Receiver Operating Characteristiccurve. See DeLong et al. (1988) for a discussion.
28The value for this test statistic is 2:78 and follows a 2(1)-distribution.
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framework, underqualication actually increases the hiring probability for insider re-
cruits. Finally, our model builds upon qualitative information derived from interviews
with the rms human resources department. Hence, while unable to directly test the
institutional mechanism, we o¤er a novel explanation that is generally supported by our
empirical analysis.
Groeneveld and Hartog (2004) investigate internal promotions of a large, only re-
cently deregulated European energy and telecommunications company. In contrast, our
case concerns employee selection with competing outsider and insider applications by a
large US public employer.29 US rms enjoy more legal protection of their rights to hire
at will. However, the personnel policies of public employers - subjected to constitutional
restraints and self-regulated by manuals of fairemployment practises - appear rather
similar to those of large European corporations which face a considerably broader set
of legal constraints.30 Currently, a new set of such regulations is emerging: the Com-
mission of the European Communities (2000) and the Council of Europe (2001) have
initiated a process to establish the formal equivalence of educational degrees and pro-
fessional experience gained in occupational training programs. This policy intends to
foster lifelong learning and - mirroring the US disparate impact experience - to include
population groups who have been socially excluded from obtaining adequate education.
The EU member states must establish systems of Accreditation of Prior Learning
(APEL) by involving all relevant parties - including providers of informal training and
non-governmental organizations representing socially excluded groups.31 The current
states of implementation vary widely across the European countries. In France, how-
ever, the Validation des Acquis Professionneles (VAP) and the Validation des Acquis de
lExperience (VAE ) decrees have already achieved that individuals can obtain a perfect
university degree equivalent certicate without attending university at all.32 Once put
into law such equivalence rules ultimately constitute binding constraints on employee
selection processes in all rms, public and private. Consequently, the rate of substitu-
29Obviously, we agree with our colleagues who caution that, unless reconrmed regularly, case study
results should not be generalized.
30 In fact, economic institutionalism holds that labor law to a considerable extent reects and standard-
izes employment practises developed in the respective economies. See Godard (2002). For an empirical
study on this claim see Chor and Freeman (2005).
31See Davies (2003) for an overview of the origins and implemenation steps of this action plan.
32 In contrast, the development in the United Kingdom is still much in the state of an initiating political
debate, for instance. Hence, it may be particularly interesting, to refer to Gallagher and Feutrie (2003)
as a combined French and Anglo-Saxon source for further insights.
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tion between formal education and professional experience should tend to be equalized
between insider and outsider applicants - thus, reducing the overqualication e¤ect in
employee selection processes. However, this development then also diminishes the signal
value of formal education. It will therefore further decrease allocative e¢ ciency.
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Appendix A: Variables Description
 The set of dependent variables
 Status = indicates hiring status: 1 if hired, 0 if not hired
Overstatus = is 1 if both hired and overqualied; 0 elsewhere; ExactStatus
and LessStatus are computed in a similar manner
HsStatus = is 1 if both hired and the job requires a High-School Diploma; 0
elsewhere; BAStatus, and MAStatus are computed in a similar manner
 Variables which concern the recruiting channel
 SEO = is 1 if the recruiting channel is State Employment O¢ ce; 0 elsewhere
 JNU = is 1 if the recruiting channel is A job notice sent to my organization;
0 elsewhere
DCD = is 1 if the recruiting channel is Direct contact from department; 0
elsewhere
ORC = is 1 if the recruiting channel is Other Recruiting Channels; 0 else-
where
NWAd = is 1 if the recruiting channel is print-ad type - Newspaper Adver-
tisement, Professional journal, newsletter, list-serve, or registry; 0 elsewhere
 IntRe¤ered = is 1 if the recruiting channel is Referred by a current em-
ployee; 0 elsewhere
WebRC = is 1 if the recruiting channel is web-based; 0 elsewhere
 Insiders = DCD & IntRe¤ered
 Variables which concern the type of each department where job positions are
opened
Centr. Admin. = is 1 if the job is in the Central Administration; 0 elsewhere
DoE Admin. = is 1 if the job is in a Department of Employment; 0 elsewhere
TechDept = is 1 if job is in the technical department; 0 elsewhere
 Variables which concern job specications
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Grade = numerical value determined on the basis of six factors and it indicates
the payment range of a position title. It increases with job requirements.
EEO = stands for Equal Employment Opportunity. It has a value of 10 for
executive and managerial positions and increases up to 70 for service and
maintenance positions.
FLSA = indicates the Fair Labor Standard Status; it is 1 if employees are
exempt (i.e. do not get paid if they do over time work) and 0 if they are not
exempt (i.e. they are paid if they work overtime)
 JobType = it is a ranking variable that takes value in between 1 and 6; 1
is the lowest ranked and corresponds to Contingent/On-Call (No Benets)
while highest job type is Regular - Full-Time (Benets Eligible)
 Quantitative variables regarding each type and number of applicants
Applications = total number of applications per position title
 Less Qual. = dummy that is 1 if less qualied; 0 otherwise
Exact Qual. = dummy that is 1 if exact qualied; 0 otherwise
Over Qual. = dummy that is 1 if over qualied; 0 otherwise
Overqualied = number of over qualied applicants for each position title
Appl.s Rc = number of applicants per recruiting channel
 Variables which are applicantscharacteristic
Age = Each applicants age; Age Sq. = square of Age
Experience = is 1 if the applicant has work experience and 0 if he does not
Exp. Ins. = interaction variable between Experience and Insiders
Education = Ranking variable that goes from 0 (i.e. 1st grade) until the
highest level of 19 (i.e. doctorate); Educ. Sq. = square of Education
Educ. Ins. = interaction variable between Education and Insiders.
 Sex = 1 if Male, 0 if Female
NonWhite = is 1 if White/Non-Hispanic; 0 elsewhere.
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the online-recruitment system
Total number of applications 33780 100%
Qualied applicants forwarded to departments 26641 78.86%
Disqualied applicants 4469 13.22%
Applications cancelled 828 2.45%
Applications withdrawn 837 2.47%
Applications led but failed to maintain contact 1005 2.97%
Number of jobs lled using on-line system 1244 3.68%
Table 2: Educational attainments of applicants and recruits
Year Doct. Mast. Bach. Some Coll. Highsch. Some High. GED n.a. Total
All applicants
2003 135 883 2208 2615 789 42 116 13 6801
2004 274 2068 4031 3850 1031 55 165 9 11483
2005 410 2271 4648 4804 1338 30 156 9 13666
2006 30 255 714 589 201 8 32 1 1830
Recruits
2003 7 24 51 84 29 1 3 0 199
2004 13 73 158 143 57 2 6 0 452
2005 19 84 181 180 50 1 7 0 522
2006 1 16 29 20 5 0 0 0 71
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Table 3: Insider-outsider distinction
Use of recruitment channels
DCD 1.38%
IR 10.02%
WebRc 77.2%
NwAd 7.76%
JNU 0.39%
SEO 0.24%
ORC 3.00%
Recruits: Outsiders vs Insiders
Hired applicants % of all hired IR (%) DCD(%) IR & DCD (%)
Less qualied 8.03 20 31 51
Exactly qualied 33.52 15.58 24.7 40.28
Over qualied 58.44 13.75 29.02 42.77
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Table 4: OLS regressionx
OLS:
(R2 = 0.0879)
Rob.
Status Coef std. error
Grade -.002*** (.001)
Applications -.000** (.000)
Appl.s Rc -.000*** (.000)
Exact Qual. .012*** (.003)
Less Qual. .011*** (.004)
EEO .000 (.000)
FLSA -.000 (.002)
Job Type -.026*** (.002)
SEO -.526*** (.100)
JNU -.003 (.025)
ORC .038*** (.012)
Web Rc. .619*** (.093)
Insiders .007 (.028)
Age -.001 (.001)
Age Sq. .000* (.000)
Experience .014*** (.002)
Exp. Ins. .106*** (.012)
Education .009*** (.003)
Educ. Sq. -.000* (.000)
Educ. Ins. .005** (.002)
Sex -.004* (.002)
Non White -.018*** (.002)
Const. .258*** (.054)
xNote: ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance levels, respectively. For all regressions,
the number of observations is N = 33780 obs.
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Table 5: The LP-modelx
2SLS: 1stStage 2SLS: 2nd Stage
(R2 =0.7183) (R2 =0.0805)
Rob. Rob.
Grade Coef std. error Status Coef. std. error
- - - Grade .010*** (.002)
Centr. Admin. -.765*** (.027) - - -
DoE Admin. -.684*** (.027) - - -
Overqualied .002*** (.000) - - -
Applications -.002*** (.000) Applications .000 (.000)
Appl.s Rc -0.000 (.000) Appl.s Rc -.000*** (.000)
Exact Qual. 0.328*** (.021) Exact Qual. .010*** (.003)
Less Qual. 0.764*** (.034) Less Qual. 0.004 (.004)
EEO -.109*** (.001) EEO .001*** (.000)
FLSA .243*** (.050) FLSA -.004* (.002)
Job Type .435*** (.008) Job Type -.032*** (.002)
SEO -.371 (.290) SEO -.519*** (.100)
JNU .047 (.118) JNU -.003 (.025)
ORC .034 (.056) ORC .038*** (.012)
Web Rc. .118 (.292) Web Rc. .616*** (.093)
Insiders .164 (.131) Insiders .005 (.028)
Age .047*** (.005) Age -.001* (.001)
Age Sq. -.000*** (.00006) Age Sq. .000** (.000)
Experience -.103*** (.015) Experience .015*** (.002)
Exp. Ins. .066 (.047) Exp. Ins. .105*** (.012)
Education -.320*** (.036) Education .012*** (.004)
Educ. Sq. .015*** (.001) Educ. Sq. -.000*** (.000)
Educ. Ins. -.018** (.008) Educ. Ins. .005** (.002)
Sex .251*** (.018) Sex -.008*** (.003)
Non White -.084*** (.015) Non White -.017*** (.002)
Const. 58.592*** (.315) Const. -.410** (.168)
- - - Predicted resid. -.013*** (.003)
xNote: ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance levels, respectively. For all regressions
the number of observations is N = 33780 obs.
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Table 6: Marginal e¤ects - logit and probit resultsx
Logistic Regression; Pr(Status)=.021 Probit Regression; Pr(Status)=.022
Variable y=x Std. Error Variable y=x Std. Error
Grade .004** (.002) Grade .005** (.002)
Applications .000 (.000) Applications .000 (.000)
Appl.s Rc -.000*** (.000) Appl.s Rc -.000*** (.000)
Exact Qual. .009*** (.002) Exact Qual. .011*** (.002)
Less Qual. .002 (.003) Less Qual. .002 (.004)
EEO .001*** (.000) EEO .001*** (.000)
FLSA -.001 (.001) FLSA -.001 (.001)
Job Type -.011*** (.001) Job Type -.014** (.001)
SEO -.022*** (.001) SEO -.022*** (.001)
JNU .012 (.012) JNU .001 (.010)
ORC .038*** (.011) ORC .027*** ( .009)
Web Rc. .305*** (.047) Web Rc. .375*** (.048)
Insiders .037* (.020) Insiders .032* (.020)
Age -.000 (.000) Age .000 (.000)
Age Sq. .000 (.000) Age Sq. -.000 (.000)
Experience .014*** (.002) Experience .015*** (.002)
Exp. Ins. .057** (.025) Exp. Ins. .056** (.022)
Education .011*** (.003) Education .013*** (.003)
Educ. Sq. -.000*** (.000) Educ. Sq. -.000*** (.000)
Educ. Ins. .058*** (.018) Educ. Ins. .043*** (.012)
Sex -.003** (.001) Sex -.004** (.001)
Non White -.011*** (.001) Non White -.013*** (.001)
Le -.006*** (.002) Pe -.008*** (.002)
xNote: ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance levels, respectively. For all regressions,
the number of observations is N = 33780 obs.
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Table 7: 3SLS regression - coe¢ cient estimates for the qualication variablesx
Variable HsStatus BAStatus MAStatus
Coe¤. Std. Error Coe¤. Std. Error Coe¤. Std. Error
Exp. .008*** (.001) .004*** (.001) .0005 (.001)
Exp. Ins. .076*** (.005) .014*** (.003) .002 (.001)
Educ. 014*** (.003) .004* (.002) -.004*** (.001)
Educ Ins. -.007*** (.001) .009*** (.001) .004*** (.000)
Table 8: Insider e¤ects on the probability to be hiredx
Variable OverStatus ExactStatus LessStatus
Coe¤. Std. Error Coe¤. Std. Error Coe¤. Std. Error
Insiders -.017 (.020) -.016 (.019) .039*** (.010)
Educ. .016*** (.003) -.014*** (.002) .007*** (.001)
Educ. Ins. .003** (.001) .003** (.001) -.002*** (.001)
xNote: ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% signicance levels, respectively. For all regressions,
the number of observations is N = 33780 obs.
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Table 9: Predicted probabilities to be hired with and without insiders
Hiring Prob. OverStatus ExactStatus LessStatus
LPM 3.73% 3.80% 2.97%
Logit 3.73% 3.80% 2.97%
Probit 3.72% 3.83% 2.95%
With insiders taken into account
High-School Diploma required 3.02% 1.19% 0.03%
Bachelors required 0.42% 1.78% 0.89%
Masters required 0.04% 0.65% 0.32%
Without insiders taken into account
High-School Diploma required 1.99% 0.87% 0.01%
Bachelors required 0.23% 1.09% 0.40%
Masters required 0.02% 0.41% 0.16%
% Change
% High-School -34.17% -27.25% -51.62%
% Bachelors -45.10% -38.32% -55.24%
% Masters -42.70% -37.10% -50.72%
Table 10: Sextiles of estimated probabilities to be hired
Group Prob Obs_1 Exp_1 Obs_0 Exp_0 Total
1 0.0096 35 40.5 5595 5589.5 5630
2 0.0135 68 65.4 5562 5564.6 5630
3 0.0179 91 87.2 5539 5542.8 5630
4 0.0260 139 122.1 5491 5507.9 5630
5 0.0433 169 184.6 5461 5445.4 5630
6 0.9072 742 744.2 4888 4885.8 5630
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Table 11: The classication table
    True    
Classied Success (S) Failure (F) Total
Positive prediction (+) 84 59 143
Negative prediction (-) 1160 32477 33637
Total 1244 32536 33780
Classied + if predicted Pr(S)  .5
True S dened as status 6= 0
Sensitivity Pr( +j S) 6.75%
Specicity Pr( -j F) 99.82%
Positive predictive value Pr( Sj +) 58.74%
Negative predictive value Pr( Fj -) 96.55%
False + rate for true F Pr( +j F) 0.18%
False - rate for true S Pr( -j S) 93.25%
False + rate for classied + Pr( Fj +) 41.26%
False - rate for classied - Pr( Sj -) 3.45%
Correctly classied 96.39%
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Figure 1: Signicance of Marginal E¤ect of InsidersExperience
-5
0
5
10
z-
st
at
is
tic
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y =  1
z-statis tics of  Interaction Ef fects af ter Probit
Figure 2: Signicance of Marginal E¤ect of InsidersEducation
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Figure 3: Sensitivity and Specicity
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Figure 4: ROC Curve
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